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Abstracts 
The focus of this paper is the identification of currency risks periods (or otherwise) in the 
WAMZ and to further test the response of exchange market pressure (EMP) to monetary 
policy related factors in these countries as well as movements in primary commodity 
prices, given the feature of these countries as primary commodity exporting countries. 
The first phase of the EMP analysis in this work employed the model-independent 
statistical method of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) to derive EMP indices in 
determining currency crisis susceptibility of the countries under study. The second part 
assessed the response of EMP to monetary policy across the WAMZ as well as evaluate 
the similarities in the patterns and strengths of the response of EMP towards checking 
for compatibility across the WAMZ countries (The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone). In this respect, the Girton and Roper (1977) model of exchange 
market pressure was applied in the model-dependent estimations for the six countries 
under study. The evaluation of exchange market pressure in the WAMZ employed the use 
of both annual and monthly data of the WAMZ countries under assessment as well as the 
CPI inflation data of the US. These data spanning between 2001 and 2015. EMP index 
were constructed for each of the WAMZ member countries within the contexts of the US 
dollar and the Nigeria naira foreign exchange markets in the WAMZ. For the model 
dependent EMP, robust regression method was applied in the estimation. Evidences 
gathered revealed mixed forms of the absorption of market pressure in the WAMZ, with 
the majority of the member countries of the WAMZ (including the lead economy, Nigeria) 
absorbing exchange market pressure through domestic currency depreciation relative to 
reserves depletion. From the results of the assessments with both annual and quarterly 
data it cannot be confidently inferred that a common exchange rate and a single foreign 
exchange market is feasible for the WAMZ countries in the proposed single currency area. 
The adoption of a single exchange rate in a common foreign exchange market should 
therefore be considered with caution. The foreign exchange market is likely to be free 
from future currency crisis. Because of the possible and expected massive influence of 
Nigeria in the foreign exchange market, foreign inflation may not hugely impact the 
proposed exchange rate and the external value of the proposed single currency.  
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1. Introduction 
In attempts to stabilise international reserve positions towards avoiding unpleasant 
movements in their rate of foreign exchange, monetary authorities have been 
experiencing foreign exchange market pressure since the beginning of the managed 
floating regime in the early 70s, when central banks face market pressure of this nature, 
the monetary model holds for exchange rates in flexible regime alone and are not likely 
to hold for exchange rates in a market pressurised regime. Therefore, the monetary 
model of exchange rate determination requires modification that would take exchange 
market pressure into cognisance. Furthermore, it is crucial for the monetary authority 
under a managed floating regime to determine the degree at which its monetary 
independence is being affected by exchange rate target. The currency crises around the 
world and the impact on the real economy as well as the contagious effects prompted 
the need for economic stability in which exchange rate stability is playing a crucial role. 
In monetary union formation process, exchange rates stability is a strong convergence 
criterion to fulfil by prospective members. One analytical tool appropriate for the 
measurement of the foreign exchange market condition and the stability of the market 
is exchange market pressure (EMP). Generally, exchange market pressure (EMP) relates 
to money market disequilibrium. This makes it important in driving the understanding 
of the mechanism and instrument that would assist in achieving the market equilibrium. 
Many different yardsticks have been developed and adopted to identify periods of crisis, 
out of which exchange market pressure (EMP) index has been of relative importance. 
Given the significance of this subject, there had been renewed theoretical and empirical 
attention towards ensuring that the question on whether financial crisis could be 
forecast and/or prevented effectively by monetary policy.1 These make research 
analysis on exchange market pressure in WAMZ member countries (The Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) to be significant. 
This paper on exchange market pressure identified currency risks period (or otherwise) 
in the WAMZ and further tests the response of exchange market pressure to monetary 
policy related factors in these countries as well as movements in primary commodity 
                                                          
1
 Many authors identified EMP analysis as one of the key tools in this respects. Some of these papers are Girton 
and Ropers (1977), Goldfajn and Gupta (1999), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyploz (1996), Kaminsky, Reinhart and Lizondo (1997), Bensiad and Jeanne (1997), Furman and Stiglitz (1998), 
Delke, Hsiao and Wang (1999), Bussiere and Mulder (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Drazen (1999), Gould 
and Kamin (2000), Flood and Jeanne (2000), Tanner (2001), Lahiri and Vegh (2003), 
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prices, given the feature of these countries as primary commodity exporting countries. 
These revealed the statistically and econometrically determined exchange rate stability 
over the years as well as the susceptibility of these countries to currency crisis. This 
study is novel in that there is no know or existing literature that has applied exchange 
market pressure in the assessment of monetary integration; and specifically in the 
evaluation of the WAMZ as a monetary union. 
The first phase of the EMP analysis in this work employed the model-independent 
statistical method of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) to derive EMP indices in 
determining currency crisis susceptibility of the countries under study. The second part 
assessed the response of EMP to monetary policy across the WAMZ as well as evaluate 
the similarities in the patterns and strengths of the response of EMP towards checking 
for compatibility across the WAMZ countries. In this respect, the Girton and Roper 
(1977) model of exchange market pressure was applied in the model-dependent 
estimations for the six countries under study. The specific aim was the investigation of 
the nature of the response of EMP to monetary variables to changes in domestic credit 
as scaled by base money; and to check if the responses of the EMP to monetary policy 
stances across the WAMZ are homogeneous in pattern.2 These were expected to reveal 
similarities or otherwise in monetary management and to show if monetary policy 
instrument of domestic credit/base money managed exchange rate pressures in the 
WAMZ in similar manner. It was also expected to show if the reaction to EMP by 
monetary policy instruments are according to theoretical presumptions in testing the 
validity of the monetary model of exchange market pressure. 
2. Theory and Models 
Exchange market pressure (EMP) depicts money market disequilibrium. Traditionally, 
the two major monetary approaches used in literature to assess money market 
disequilibrium are: (i) monetary approach to exchange rate; and (ii) monetary approach 
to balance of payments. While foreign reserves variation assists in restoring the equilibrium under the balance of payments’ monetary approach, the change in exchange 
                                                          
2 Domestic credit is a more appropriate proxy for monetary policy in that it is directly controlled by monetary 
authorities. While domestic credit/base money is quantitative monetary management policy tool, interest rate is a 
market-based monetary management policy instrument. These two policy techniques have different implications. 
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rate would cause the equilibrium restoration under the monetary approach to exchange 
rate (Frankel, 1976 and Mussa, 1976). Foreign reserves changes or exchange rate 
changes (one in isolation of the other) would not provide enough guide in revealing the 
features and accurate picture of the external account of any economy. For instance, 
monetary authority can delay or avoid depreciation in exchange rate (partially) if 
foreign reserves are depleted so as to inject foreign currency into the foreign market. On 
the other hand, foreign currency could be purchased from the market to fortify foreign 
reserves; and this restrains the appreciation in the rate of exchange as prompted by the 
underlying fundamentals. These show that there would be misleading view of external 
position of an economy if either of the two intervention tools (foreign reserves 
variations and exchange rate movements) to the exclusion of the other is emphasised. 
This makes a good case for a composite definition and description of EMP in the model-
dependent assessment. This composite description of EMP incorporates foreign reserve 
variations and exchange rate changes in characterising the pressure in the exchange 
market. This is the starting point of the first seminal work on EMP by Girton and Roper 
(GR) 1977 in which an EMP model was developed to reflect exchange market pressure 
as a composite variable. The EMP values represents the magnitude of the foreign 
exchange market disequilibrium which should consequently be removed by respective 
change in exchange rate and/or change in foreign reserve position, depending on the 
ruling exchange rate regime. 
Exchange market pressure are measured in two ways as: (i) model-independent and (ii) 
model-dependent. The model independent exchange market pressure index (EMPI) 
measures the extent of contagion-caused market pressure on a currency vulnerability of 
a country to currency crisis. For a proposed currency union, it reveals if the 
macroeconomic fundamentals of intending members are strong for single currency and 
single exchange rate in exchange rate integration and further, if the underlying 
macroeconomic variables can  withstand market tensions and exchange rate regime 
vulnerabilities that may arise in the future monetary union. The weighted exchange 
market pressure index (EMPI) appropriate for the measurement of the extent of 
currency pressure is expressed as: 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = (1𝛼 %∆𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + (1𝛽 ∆(𝑖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡∗ ) − [1𝛾 (%∆𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − %∆ 𝑟𝑡∗)]                       1 
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where 𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is the price of a relative foreign currency in terms of country 𝑖′𝑠 currency at 
time 𝑡. 𝑖𝑖,𝑡 is the nominal interest of country 𝑖 at time 𝑡;  𝑖𝑡∗  is the foreign country's 
nominal interest rate, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the nominal interest of country 𝑖 at time 𝑡;   𝑟𝑡∗  is the ratio of 
international reserves to narrow money supply (M1) in the foreign country while 𝛼, 𝛽, 
and 𝛾 are the respective standard deviations appropriately applied as weights. This 
measure of market pressure takes its roots from the idea that when there are excess 
demand and supply in a foreign exchange market, there can be changes in foreign 
exchanges price as well as changes in reserve level.  
The model-dependent study focusses on developing a model that provides links 
between EMP and monetary policy in order to check if EMP responds to monetary 
policy in the right manner (according to theoretical underpinnings). Basically, the 
Girton-Roper model of EMP is a variant of the monetary approach to exchange rate 
determination. The model is based on monetary approach to balance of payment which 
revolves around the notion of demand for money and supply of money. The idea within 
the monetary approach to balance of payment is that excess money supply causes 
international reserve losses under the fixed exchange rate regime and by implication, 
this leads to balance of payments deficits. Under flexible exchange rate regime, currency 
depreciation absorbs the pressure on balance of payments. Therefore, the need for 
equilibrium between domestic money supply and money demand necessitate the 
evolution of the exchange market theory. Naturally, excess money supply causes 
increases in demand for goods and services (the implication of demand-pull inflation) which translates into increase in economic agents’ demands for foreign goods and 
services and this in turn, causes reserve depletion in the domestic market. The 
modelling of exchange market pressure therefore assesses whether or not monetary 
authority absorbs pressure in the foreign exchange market by drawing down 
(depleting) reserves or by currency depreciation. The principal theoretical proposition 
of the modelling of EMP by Girton and Roper (1977) is that whenever the domestic 
money market equilibrium is disturbed, the resulting disequilibrium is restored through 
some combinations of international reserve outflows (or inflow) and depreciation  (or 
appreciation) of currency. Therefore, to restore the money market disequilibrium, the 
excess domestic money demand will prompt a combination of reserve depletion 
(outflow) and depreciation of currency. In the instance of excess domestic money 
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supply, the consequence will be some combinations of inflow of reserves and 
appreciation of currency. This is a strong reason for the appropriateness of the G-R 
model of EMP in the fixed, managed floating and floating exchange rate regimes. Under 
the fixed exchange rate regime, the change in exchange rate is zero and under a 
floating/flexible exchange rate regime, the change in reserve is zero. Either of reserve 
losses and currency appreciation (or a combination of both) absorbs exchange market 
pressure under the managed floating system. The basic ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ conditions for the G-R model are: (i) the money market 
equilibrium condition; and (ii) the imposition of the purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Therefore in deriving the G-R model, it is necessary to begin with the formulation of the 
money market and the PPP. In the first instance, for equilibrium in the money market to 
hold, it is necessary to have: 𝑀𝑑 = 𝑀𝑠                                                                      2 
where 𝑀𝑑  is the demand for money and 𝑀𝑠  is money supply. Money demand and 
money supply can further be specified as: 𝑀𝑑 = 𝑘𝑃𝑌                                                                    3 
and  𝑀𝑠 = 𝑚(𝐵)                                                                   4 
where is 𝑘 a constant, 𝑃 is domestic price level, 𝑌 is real output, 𝑚 is money multiplier 
and is 𝐵 monetary base. This makes money supply to be the product of money 
multiplier (𝑚) and monetary base (𝐵) in a functional relationship in which: 𝐵 = 𝑅 + 𝐷                                                                    5 
Where R is net foreign assets (which is the foreign component of monetary base) and 𝐷 
is domestic credit (which is the domestic component of monetary base). In working 
towards the derivation of the G-R model, the PPP theory is incorporated at this point: 𝐸 = 𝑃∗𝑃                                                                           6 
or  
      𝑃 = 𝐸(𝑃∗) 
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where 𝐸 is the nominal exchange rate, 𝑃 is the domestic price level and 𝑃∗ is the foreign 
price level. It is important to note here that the nominal exchange rate in this modelling 
is the number of units of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency. If Equation 3 
and 4 above are substituted into Equation 2 above, we will have: 𝑘𝑃𝑌 = 𝑚(𝑅 + 𝐷)                                                                   7 
If the equivalent of P in Equation 6 above is made to substitute for P, in Equation 7, this 
yields: 𝑘 (𝑃∗𝐸 ) 𝑌 = 𝑚(𝑅 + 𝐷)                                                               8 
Assuming that people hold a fraction of nominal income in the form of cash, as constant 𝑘, we can express Equation 8 in percentages form thus: 𝑃∗ − 𝑒 + 𝑦 = 𝑚 + 𝑟 + 𝑑                                                          9 
where 𝑃∗ is percentage change in foreign price level, 𝑒 is percentage change in nominal 
real exchange rate, 𝑦 is percentage change in real output, 𝑎 is percentage change in 
money multiplier, 𝑟 is percentage change in reserve and 𝑑 is percentage change in 
domestic credit. The rearrangement of the terms in Equation 9 leads to the G-R 
exchange market pressure model expressed as: 𝑟 + 𝑒 = 𝑃∗ + 𝑦 − 𝑚 − 𝑑                                                          10 
where (𝑟 + 𝑒) represents exchange market pressure.  
The intuition of the G-R model is that increase in domestic credit (and/or money 
multiplier): (i) stimulates proportionate loss of foreign reserve (with no change in 
exchange rate); or (ii) stimulates a proportionate depreciation of domestic currency 
(with no change in reserve) or (iii) a combination of the two, all at a given rates of 
growth of domestic income and foreign prices. On the other hand, when there is 
increase in domestic income and/or foreign price, the effect is proportional inflow of 
international reserves and proportional appreciation of domestic currency. It is 
established in literature that Equation 10 could be augmented with a variable 𝑏, which 
is (𝑒𝑟) in order to check the response of monetary authority in the absorption of 
exchange market pressure through the draw-down of reserve or by exchange rate 
depreciation.  
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The augmented equation becomes: 𝑟 + 𝑒 = 𝑃∗ + 𝑦 − 𝑎 − 𝑑 + 𝑏                                           11 
When the coefficient of 𝑏 is positive and significant, this means that currency 
depreciation is applied by the monetary authority to absorb exchange market pressure. 
A negative and significant coefficient of 𝑏 shows that reserve depletion is the tool 
employed by monetary authority in the absorption of exchange market pressure. When 
the coefficient of 𝑏 is insignificant, this is an indication of the lack of sensitivity of 
monetary authority to these components of exchange market pressure. 
3. Data and Methods 
The evaluation of exchange market pressure in the WAMZ employed the use of both 
annual and monthly data of the WAMZ countries under assessment as well as the CPI 
inflation data of the US. These data spanning between 2001 and 2015 and sourced from 
the databases of the EIU, the IMF and the World Bank, are for nominal interest rates, 
international reserves, nominal exchange rate (US dollar), domestic credit, narrow 
money supply, net foreign assets and real GDP. For the construction of the exchange 
market pressure index (EMPI), related annual data (2001 to 2014) were applied while 
monthly data (2001M1 to 2015M12) which were converted from the sourced annual 
data were used in the case of model dependent analysis of exchange markets pressures 
across the WAMZ. EMPI were constructed for each of the WAMZ member countries 
within the contexts of the US dollar and the Nigeria naira foreign exchange markets in 
the WAMZ. The span of the period for the exchange market pressure estimations were 
made shorter so as to avoid the possible distorting influences and effects of the civil 
wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone on their exchange markets as well as other exchange 
markets within the zone. Variables involved in the construction of the EMPI were 
relatively measured against those obtained in the US (for the US dollar/WAMZ exchange 
rates) and in Nigeria, the strongest WAMZ economy (for the Nigerian naira/WAMZ 
countries exchange rates).3 For each WAMZ country, currency crisis thresholds were 
estimated as the sum of the standard deviation and mean of the weighted exchange 
                                                          
3Nigeria is the strongest economy with over 80% of the zone's total GDP and by implication forming around same 
proportion of the total size of the entire proposed monetary zone's foreign exchange markets. 
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market pressure index derived from the estimation of Equation 1 over the sample 
period thus: 𝑇 = 𝜎𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐼 + 𝜇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐼                                                                12 
where 𝑇 indicated threshold while 𝜎 and 𝜇 denote the EMPI sample standard deviation 
and mean respectively. This links crisis with the extent of volatility and the average 
pressure in the foreign exchange market. A country is therefore susceptible to currency 
crisis if the weighted EMPI is greater than the applied threshold. There are no arbitrary 
weighting of market volatilities and averages as many researchers did. This was 
perceived inappropriate for the exchange market realities in developing economies, the 
category in which the WAMZ countries belong. In determining if the WAMZ countries 
are currency crisis vulnerable, this research work applied the following five different 
currency crisis thresholds situation for the WAMZ countries: (i) WAMZ country-specific 
threshold (US dollars exchange markets); (ii) WAMZ country-specific threshold 
(Nigerian naira exchange markets); (iii) WAMZ average threshold (US dollars exchange 
markets); (iv) WAMZ average threshold (Nigerian naira exchange markets); and (v) 
Nigeria currency crisis threshold.  
For the model dependent EMP, robust regression method was applied in the estimation 
of Equations 10 and 11above. A robust regression is that which: (a) is reasonably 
efficient and unbiased; (b) small deviation from the assumptions of the model will not 
substantially impair the performances of the estimated model; and (iii) large deviation 
does not invalidate the model completely. OLS regression is not robust with outliers 
because it can yield results that are misleading if such outliers are undetected. If 
outliers, influential observations and heavy-tailed distribution can hinder the efficiency 
of OLS regression, then an alternative in robust regression is appropriate. Robust 
statistics aim at describing the structure best fitting the bulk of the data, identify 
deviating data points (outliers) for further treatments, identify (or warn about) highly 
influential data points (leverage points), deal with unsuspected serial correlation. 
Consequently, robust regression devises estimators that are not so strongly affected by 
outliers in order to produce resistant results in the presence of outliers as it dampens 
the influences of outlying observations so as to provide better fit for the majority of the 
data and thereby achieve the necessary stability. Theoretically, what apply in explaining 
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the performance of robust regression are the properties of efficiency, breakdown points 
and high leverage points.  
The process of the evaluation of the model-dependent EMP across the WAMZ in this 
assessment started with the OLS estimation of the augmented EMP model as expressed 
in Equation 11, in order to check for outliers in the variables involved in the modelling 
of EMP for the six WAMZ countries. The output of the OLS estimations were not be 
reported since the purpose was to check for the possible presence of outliers in 
justifying the use of the robust least square (RLS) regression method for same purpose. 
The RLS estimation performed here used the M-estimation option (which has a function 
that provides less weight to outliers) and applied the Welsch objective specification 
with Huber Type I covariance estimates (on which the z-statistics estimations are 
based) and zero-centered Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) estimator. MAD is 
regarded as a robust measure of central tendency and unlike mean and standard 
deviation, it is not sensitive to the presence of outliers. MAD is the median absolute 
value of the residuals (which are deviations from the median of the data), measuring 
statistical dispersions. Since standard deviation can easily be influenced by outliers 
because the distance from mean are squared in standard deviation, large deviations are 
consequently weighted heavily. However, with MAD applied here, deviations of outliers 
are not relevant. For the iteration control, this study allows for 500 maximum iteration 
and 0.0001 convergence. In robust least square (RLS) regression, R-squared and Rw-
squared statistics are the two measures of goodness-of-fit. This study applied Rw-
squared which was deemed a better measure of fit than the R-square reported in the 
RLS regression. One other special statistic reported by RLS is Rn-square statistic which 
is the robust version of the Wald test of the true value of the coefficients, based on 
sample estimate. This (calculated by applying the standard Wald test quadratic form) 
tests the hypothesis that all the coefficients are equal to zero. Therefore, a p-value of 
0.00 of the Rn-squared statistics depicts strong rejection of the null hypothesis that all 
non-constant coefficients are equal to zero. 
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4. Results and Findings 
To benchmark for currency crisis susceptibility, the estimated thresholds for individual 
WAMZ countries as well as the related averages under the two exchange markets 
situations are highlighted in Table 1 below.  
Table 1: Exchange Market Pressure Index Thresholds 
US Dollar Nominal Exchange Rates 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone Average 
Threshold 3.2907 2.6959 2.2261 1.7115 4.1698 2.7095 2.8006 
Nigeria Naira Nominal Exchange Rates 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone Average 
Threshold 1.0597 1.5006 1.3268 -0.0216 na 0.3526 0.8436 
Source: Author's Estimation 
Table 2: Currency Crises Definitions with Country Specific Threshold (US Dollar Exchange 
Markets) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 
(3.29) 
0.33 
(N) 
2.48 
(N) 
3.09 
(N) 
6.27 
(Y) 
0.21 
(N) 
-3.94 
(N) 
2.68 
(N) 
-1.1 
(N) 
1.24 
(N) 
2.1 
(N) 
0.57 
(N) 
-0.34 
(N) 
0.36 
(N) 
1.64 
(N) 
2.46 
(N) 
Ghana 
(2.70) 
6.09 
(Y) 
0.84 
(N) 
-3.98 
(N) 
-3.83 
(N) 
-2 
(N) 
-1.84 
(N) 
-1.51 
(N) 
0.79 
(N) 
2.3 
(N) 
1.93 
(N) 
-2.64 
(N) 
0.29 
(N) 
1.45 
(N) 
0.74 
(N) 
2.01 
(N) 
Guinea 
(2.22) 
na 
1.13 
(N) 
1.11 
(N) 
0.78 
(N) 
1.08 
(N) 
3.6 
(Y) 
1.78 
(N) 
-0.54 
(N) 
0.43 
(N) 
0.17 
(N) 
1.89 
(N) 
2.4 
(Y) 
-0.82 
(N) 
-1.42 
(N) 
2.18 
(N) 
Liberia 
(1.71) 
-0.75 
(N) 
3.1 
(Y) 
0.59 
(N) 
-1.45 
(N) 
-2.99 
(N) 
-1.32 
(N) 
-2.02 
(N) 
0.49 
(N) 
2.03 
(Y) 
1.74 
(N) 
0.06 
(N) 
-0.11 
(N) 
0.5 
(N) 
0.88 
(N) 
na 
Nigeria 
(4.17) 
1.43 
(N) 
3.55 
(N) 
3.8 
(N) 
1.84 
(N) 
1.58 
(N) 
-2.37 
(N) 
0.24 
(N) 
-0.68 
(N) 
0.88 
(N) 
0.41 
(N) 
2.26 
(N) 
4.52 
(Y) 
3.55 
(N) 
1.33 
(N) 
1.74 
(N) 
S/Leone 
(2.71) 
0.17 
(N) 
-2.24 
(N) 
0.26 
(N) 
2.89 
(Y) 
0.77 
(N) 
-1.9 
(N) 
-0.87 
(N) 
-0.09 
(N) 
0.31 
(N) 
1.33 
(N) 
3.5 
(Y) 
2.58 
(N) 
-0.56 
(N) 
-2.65 
(N) 
-0.98 
(N) 
Source: Author's estimations Note: ‘Y’ denotes susceptibility to currency crisis, while ‘N’ means non-susceptibility to currency crisis. 
 
For the US dollar market country-specific threshold, Table 2 above shows that over the 
period covered by this study, The Gambia (in 2003), Ghana (in 2000), and Nigeria (in 
2011) were susceptible to currency crisis once while the vulnerability of Guinea (in 
2005 and 2011), Liberia (in 2001 and 2008) and Sierra Leone (in 2003 and 2004) to 
currency crisis were twice during the period covered by this study. Figure 1 below 
shows the diagrammatic representations of the information in Table 3. In these charts 
(and subsequent related charts in this section), point zero line is the currency crisis cut-
off point and the sizes of the bars indicate the magnitudes of currency crisis ‘susceptibility’ and ‘non-susceptibility’. When bars are located above point zero, they 
depict periods of susceptibility to currency crisis while bar below the zero point are 
periods of non-susceptibility to currency crisis. 
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Figure 1: Country Specific Threshold Currency Crises Definitions (US Dollar Exchange Markets) 
 Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9.5 Output 
In comparison with the scenario of the Nigerian naira bilateral exchange markets, country-
specific crisis threshold, The Gambia (in 2003), Ghana (in 2000) , Guinea (in 2005) and Sierra 
Leone (in 2010 were susceptible once and Liberia was not vulnerable according to the 
information in Table 3 below and as reflected in Figure 2 below. 
Table 3: Country Specific Threshold Currency Crises Definitions  
 (Nigerian Naira Exchange Markets) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 
(1.06) 
-0.4 
(N) 
-0.31 
(N) 
-0.1 
(N) 
4.31 
(Y) 
-0.87 
(N) 
-0.9 
(N) 
-2.2 
(N) 
-0.8 
(N) 
-0.6 
(N) 
-2.9 
(N) 
-1.62 
(N) 
-4.13 
(N) 
-2.57 
(N) 
0.23 
(N) 
0.68 
(N) 
Ghana 
(1.50) 
4.66 
(Y) 
-0.27 
(N) 
-4.0 
(N) 
-1.8 
(N) 
-2.23 
(N) 
0.25 
(N) 
-1.14 
(N) 
0.66 
(N) 
1.05 
(N) 
-1.1 
(N) 
-2.93 
(N) 
-2.76 
(N) 
-0.7 
(N) 
-0.2 
(N) 
1.26 
(N) 
Guinea 
(1.33) 
na 
-1.17 
(N) 
-1.5 
(N) 
-0.6 
(N) 
-0.28 
(N) 
4.92 
(Y) 
1.26 
(N) 
-0.2 
(N) 
-0.5 
(N) 
-3.85 
(N) 
-0.15 
(N) 
-1.31 
(N) 
-3.63 
(N) 
-2.8 
(N) 
-3.6 
(N) 
Liberia 
(-0.02) 
-1.6 
(N) 
-12.2 
(N) 
-63.2 
(N) 
-19.3 
(N) 
-22.6 
(N) 
-3.8 
(N) 
-19.8 
(N) 
-5.5 
(N) 
-4.1 
(N) 
-21.1 
(N) 
-11.2 
(N) 
-13.3 
(N) 
-10.2 
(N) 
-7.5 
(N) 
na 
S/Leone 
(0.35) 
-1.4 
(N) 
-4.95 
(N) 
-3.1 
(N) 
0.23 
(N) 
-0.12 
(N) 
0.22 
(N) 
-0.95 
(N) 
0.38 
(N) 
-0.2 
(N) 
-4.92 
(N) 
1.12 
(Y) 
-1.38 
(N) 
-3.48 
(N) 
-3.9 
(N) 
-2.4 
(N) 
Source: Author's estimations. Note: ‘Y’ denotes non-susceptibility to currency crisis, while ‘N’ means non-susceptibility to currency crisis. 
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Figure 2: Country Specific Threshold Currency Crises Definitions (Nigerian Naira Exchange 
Markets) 
 Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9.5 Output 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: WAMZ Average Threshold (2.80) Currency Crises Definitions  
(US Dollar Exchange Markets) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 
 
0.33 
(N) 
2.48 
(N) 
3.09 
(Y) 
6.27 
(Y) 
0.21 
(N) 
-3.94 
(N) 
2.68 
(N) 
-1.1 
(N) 
1.24 
(N) 
2.1 
(N) 
0.57 
(N) 
-0.34 
(N) 
0.36 
(N) 
1.64 
(N) 
2.46 
(N) 
Ghana 
 
6.09 
(Y) 
0.84 
(N) 
-3.98 
(N) 
-3.83 
(N) 
-2 
(N) 
-1.84 
(N) 
-1.51 
(N) 
0.79 
(N) 
2.3 
(N) 
1.93 
(N) 
-2.64 
(N) 
0.29 
(N) 
1.45 
(N) 
0.74 
(N) 
2.01 
(N) 
Guinea 
 
na 
1.13 
(N) 
1.11 
(N) 
0.78 
(N) 
1.08 
(N) 
3.6 
(Y) 
1.78 
(N) 
-0.54 
(N) 
0.43 
(N) 
0.17 
(N) 
1.89 
(N) 
2.4 
(N) 
-0.82 
(N) 
-1.42 
(N) 
2.18 
(N) 
Liberia 
 
-0.75 
(N) 
3.1 
(Y) 
0.59 
(N) 
-1.45 
(N) 
-2.99 
(N) 
-1.32 
(N) 
-2.02 
(N) 
0.49 
(N) 
2.03 
(N) 
1.74 
(N) 
0.06 
(N) 
-0.11 
(N) 
0.5 
(N) 
0.88 
(N) 
na 
Nigeria 
 
1.43 
(N) 
3.55 
(Y) 
3.8 
(Y) 
1.84 
(N) 
1.58 
(N) 
-2.37 
(N) 
0.24 
(N) 
-0.68 
(N) 
0.88 
(N) 
0.41 
(N) 
2.26 
(N) 
4.52 
(Y) 
3.55 
(Y) 
1.33 
(N) 
1.74 
(N) 
S/Leone 
 
0.17 
(N) 
-2.24 
(N) 
0.26 
(N) 
2.89 
(Y) 
0.77 
(N) 
-1.9 
(N) 
-0.87 
(N) 
-0.09 
(N) 
0.31 
(N) 
1.33 
(N) 
3.5 
(Y) 
2.58 
(N) 
-0.56 
(N) 
-2.65 
(N) 
-0.98 
(N) 
Source: Author's estimations Note: ‘Y’ denotes non-susceptibility to currency crisis, while ‘N’ means non-susceptibility to currency crisis. 
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Figure 3: WAMZ Average Threshold (2.80) Currency Crises Definitions (US Dollar Exchange 
Markets) 
 Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9.5 Output 
 
When the WAMZ average threshold of 2.80 was set in the US dollar exchange markets, 
Table 4 and Figure 3 above exhibit currency crisis susceptibility in all the six countries 
with Nigeria (in 2001, 2003, 2011 and 2012) having the highest of four years of 
vulnerability. The Gambia (in 2002 and 2003) and Sierra Leone (in 2003 and 2010) had 
two while Ghana (in 2000) and Guinea (in 2005) and Liberia (in 2001) were prone to 
crisis once. Nigeria, the lead foreign exchange market recorded the highest number of 
currency crisis vulnerability according to the WAMZ average threshold. This is a result 
that comes with negative implications for the exchange market integration of the 
WAMZ. 
Table 5 and Figure 4 below give crisis information when the WAMZ average for the 
Nigerian naira exchange markets in which an average crisis threshold of 0.84 was set. 
Under this scenario, Liberia shows no sign suggesting crisis. The Gambia (in 2003) and 
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Sierra Leone (in 2010) had once, Ghana (in 2000, 2008 and 2014) and Guinea (in 2005 
and 2006) had twice. 
Table 5: WAMZ Average Threshold (0.84) Currency Crises Definitions  
(Nigerian Naira Exchange Markets) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 
 
-0.4 
(N) 
-0.31 
(N) 
-0.11 
(N) 
4.31 
(Y) 
-0.87 
(N) 
-0.91 
(N) 
-2.2 
(N) 
-0.78 
(N) 
-0.65 
(N) 
-2.87 
(N) 
-1.62 
(N) 
-4.13 
(N) 
-2.57 
(N) 
0.23 
(N) 
0.68 
(N) 
Ghana 
 
4.66 
(Y) 
-0.27 
(N) 
-4.07 
(N) 
-1.76 
(N) 
-2.23 
(N) 
0.25 
(N) 
-1.14 
(N) 
0.66 
(N) 
1.05 
(Y) 
-1.1 
(N) 
-2.93 
(N) 
-2.76 
(N) 
-0.7 
(N) 
-0.25 
(N) 
1.26 
(Y) 
Guinea 
 
na 
-1.17 
(N) 
-1.53 
(N) 
-0.57 
(N) 
-0.28 
(N) 
4.92 
(Y) 
1.26 
(Y) 
-0.19 
(N) 
-0.51 
(N) 
-3.85 
(N) 
-0.15 
(N) 
-1.31 
(N) 
-3.63 
(N) 
-2.77 
(N) 
-3.64 
(N) 
Liberia 
 
-1.6 
(N) 
-12.2 
(N) 
-63.2 
(N) 
-19.3 
(N) 
-22.6 
(N) 
-3.78 
(N) 
-19.8 
(N) 
-5.54 
(N) 
-4.11 
(N) 
-21.1 
(N) 
-11.2 
(N) 
-13.3 
(N) 
-10.3 
(N) 
-7.48 
(N) 
na 
S/Leone 
 
-1.45 
(N) 
-4.95 
(N) 
-3.12 
(N) 
0.23 
(N) 
-0.12 
(N) 
0.22 
(N) 
-0.95 
(N) 
0.38 
(N) 
-0.16 
(N) 
-4.92 
(N) 
1.12 
(Y) 
-1.38 
(N) 
-3.48 
(N) 
-3.94 
(N) 
-2.44 
(N) 
Source: Author's estimations Note: ‘Y’ denotes non-susceptibility to currency crisis, while ‘N’ means non-susceptibility to currency crisis. 
 
Figure 4: WAMZ Average Threshold (0.84) Currency Crises Definitions (Nigerian Naira Exchange 
Markets) 
 Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9.5 Output 
These currency crisis information generated with the application of the WAMZ average 
thresholds calculations are essential for the future single exchange rate market within 
the WAMZ.  The size of the Nigerian economy within the WAMZ, having direct effect and 
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monetary union, prompted the setting of the Nigerian currency crisis threshold of 4.17 
against the EMP indices of the other five WAMZ countries; and the results of crisis 
vulnerability estimations for the five countries, in this context for the US dollar 
exchange market are shown in Table 5 below. In this result, only The Gambia (in 2003) 
and Ghana (in 2000) exhibit crisis vulnerability over the period of study. 
Table 6: Nigerian Threshold (4.17) Currency Crises Definitions  
(US Dollar Exchange Markets) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 
 
0.33 
(N) 
2.48 
(N) 
3.09 
(N) 
6.27 
(Y) 
0.21 
(N) 
-3.94 
(N) 
2.68 
(N) 
-1.1 
(N) 
1.24 
(N) 
2.1 
(N) 
0.57 
(N) 
-0.34 
(N) 
0.36 
(N) 
1.64 
(N) 
2.46 
(N) 
Ghana 
 
6.09 
(Y) 
0.84 
(N) 
-3.98 
(N) 
-3.83 
(N) 
-2 
(N) 
-1.84 
(N) 
-1.51 
(N) 
0.79 
(N) 
2.3 
(N) 
1.93 
(N) 
-2.64 
(N) 
0.29 
(N) 
1.45 
(N) 
0.74 
(N) 
2.01 
(N) 
Guinea 
 
na 
1.13 
(N) 
1.11 
(N) 
0.78 
(N) 
1.08 
(N) 
3.6 
(N) 
1.78 
(N) 
-0.54 
(N) 
0.43 
(N) 
0.17 
(N) 
1.89 
(N) 
2.4 
(N) 
-0.82 
(N) 
-1.42 
(N) 
2.18 
(N) 
Liberia 
 
-0.75 
(N) 
3.1 
(N) 
0.59 
(N) 
-1.45 
(N) 
-2.99 
(N) 
-1.32 
(N) 
-2.02 
(N) 
0.49 
(N) 
2.03 
(N) 
1.74 
(N) 
0.06 
(N) 
-0.11 
(N) 
0.5 
(N) 
0.88 
(N) 
na 
S/Leone 
 
0.17 
(N) 
-2.24 
(N) 
0.26 
(N) 
2.89 
(N) 
0.77 
(N) 
-1.9 
(N) 
-0.87 
(N) 
-0.09 
(N) 
0.31 
(N) 
1.33 
(N) 
3.5 
(N) 
2.58 
(N) 
-0.56 
(N) 
-2.65 
(N) 
-0.98 
(N) 
Source: Author's estimations Note: ‘Y’ denotes non-susceptibility to currency crisis, while ‘N’ means non-susceptibility to currency crisis. 
The implications of the results in Table 6 above is that if the currency market pressure 
in Nigeria is the core currency crisis determinant, three WAMZ countries (Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone) are not likely vulnerable to currency crisis, given the past 
trends of currency susceptibility.  
Figure 5: Nigerian Threshold (4.17) Currency Crises Definitions (US Dollar Exchange Markets) 
 Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9.5 Output 
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Positive enough, Nigeria showed signs of currency crisis susceptibility just once (in 
2011) in the results of the US dollar market threshold estimation in Table 1 above when 
its own threshold of 4.17 (applied for investigation yielding results in Table 6) is set 
against its EMP index. The susceptibility of the WAMZ countries in this scenario is 
shown graphically in Figure 5 above. 
What the information generated under this section suggest is that the WAMZ is not 
currency crisis susceptible, given the low degrees of currency crisis susceptibility (of 
between 7% lowest and 27% highest) exhibited by the WAMZ countries over the 15-
year period covered by this study. These high currency-crisis-free results portend stability in the WAMZ’s future single exchange rate and single foreign exchange market.  
For the estimations of the model-dependent exchange market pressure, as the first step, 
ADF unit root roots tests for stationarity was performed on all the data applied in this 
exchange market pressure evaluation at 5% level of significance as displayed in Table 7 
below.  
Table 7: Results the ADF Unit Roots Tests for the Variables of Exchange Market Pressure 
Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Exchange Market Pressure  ∆Domestic Credit/Money Base  
Domestic Real GDP Growth ∆Money Multiplier 
Monetary Response Variable  
Foreign (US) Inflation (-1.8961) ∆Commodity Index (-8.7045*) 
-3.1214** 
-4.0200* 
-5.6633* 
-17.6505* 
-12.8013* 
 
-3.4065* 
-3.5298* 
-3.0180** 
-15.3650* 
-13.3738* 
 
-3.9046* 
-1.8202 
-4.9966* 
-14.2086* 
-13.2085* 
 
-7.6934* 
-11.0540* 
-3.0330** 
-17.6906* 
-13.1097* 
 
-3.2906* 
-2.9593* 
-4.1619* 
-11.7025* 
-4.4156* 
 
-4.8507* 
-2.3718 
-0.4969 
-13.3079* 
-13.3808* 
Critical values of ADF Unit Roots Test 
1% 5% 10% 
-3.9591 -3.0810 -2.6813 
Source: Author's estimations and EViews 7 Output 
The data for foreign inflation, domestic credit/base money change for Guinea and Sierra 
Leone as a well as domestic real GDP growth for Sierra Leone were not stationary at 
levels, and were made stationary at first difference so that they can be used for 
regression. Every other variables employed were stationary at levels in the ‘with constant’ ADF unit root tests. Influence statistics and the leverage plots resulting from 
the OLS estimates are displayed in Figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6: Plots of Influence Statistics and Leverage of OLS Estimations of EMP 
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Ghana: 
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Guinea: 
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Liberia: 
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Nigeria: 
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Sierra Leone: 
 
 Sources: Author’s Estimations and Eview 9.5 Output 
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The spikes in the graphs for the four measures of influence revealed a good number of 
outliers in the data employed in the modelling of EMP for the WAMZ countries. These 
were further confirmed by the various leverage plots. These provided the basis for the 
justification of the appropriateness of the use of the robust least square regression in 
this EMP evaluation. The results of the robust least square regression of the model-
dependent exchange market pressure in the six WAMZ countries are exhibited below in 
Table 8, showing results from the model without the sensitivity factor of monetary 
responses and Table 9 exhibiting these sensitivity factor of monetary responses.  
Table 8: Results of the Robust Least Square Regression Estimation of Exchange Market Pressure 
Model 
Independent Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Constant ∆Domestic Credit/Money Base  
Domestic Real GDP Growth 
Foreign (US) Inflation ∆Money Multiplier ∆Commodity Price Index 
 
 
 
R2 
Rw2 
Deviance 
Prob. (Rn-Square Statistics) 
JB-Statistics (Prob.) 
No. of Observations 
-0.0908* 
-0.1986* 
0.7012* 
-34.535* 
0.0008 
-0.134* 
 
 
 
-0.01 
0.84 
60.65 
0.00 
0.00 
159 
-0.7621* 
-2.570* 
-0.0353 
10.2066* 
0.0347* 
-0.0205* 
 
 
 
0.45 
0.75 
227.25 
0.00 
0.00 
177 
-1.4502* 
-69.418* 
3.4222* 
-5.0205* 
-0.0473* 
0.1336* 
 
 
 
0.03 
0.33 
2132.41 
0.00 
0.00 
177 
2.8136* 
-0.0306* 
-1.1530* 
12.7280* 
0.0326* 
-0.0060 
 
 
 
0.08 
0.17 
3726.38 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
-2.4704* 
-0.1730* 
2.6761* 
-6.1774* 
0.0107* 
-0.0266* 
 
 
 
0.43 
0.81 
324.34 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
-0.1373* 
0.1825 
0.1010* 
3.0914* 
0.0015 
-0.0199* 
 
 
 
0.03 
0.06 
559.30 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
    Source: Author's Estimation and EViews9.5 Output 
In the results in Table 8 above and Table 9 below, the estimations of the RLS regression 
show that almost all the coefficients are significant at 1% level of significance except for The Gambia’s money multiplier, Ghana’s and Sierra Leone’s real GDP growth and 
commodity price index change for Liberia. In the estimation of EMP without the 
inclusion of the sensitivity factor, Table 9 reveals that for all the WAMZ countries, 
correct theoretical signs were reported for domestic credit growth (except for Sierra 
Leone), for domestic real GDP growth (except for Ghana and Liberia). For the countries 
with the correct signs in domestic credit growth, these are indications that currency 
depreciation and depletion of reserves in these countries were caused by this factor. 
What the results of the domestic real GDP growth portend is that through reserve 
accumulation and domestic currency appreciation, this variable only influences EMP in 
The Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Foreign (US) inflation only yielded the 
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correct theoretical sign in the cases of Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone indicating these 
as countries in which foreign inflation affects EMP. By the implication of this, foreign 
inflation does not affect exchange market pressures in Nigeria, the lead economy. 
Money multiplier produced the correct sign only for Guinea with the implication that 
virtually in all countries of the WAMZ (except Guinea), increase in money neither led to 
international reserve depletion nor domestic currency depreciation. Primary 
commodity index change yielded the correct sign only for Guinea, meaning that apart 
from Guinea, commodity price change does not increase reserves and does not cause 
domestic currency appreciation. This could be attributed to the global financial 
downturn and the downward trend in the prices of primary commodity over the period 
covered by this study. Explanatory powers of these coefficients are strong, particularly 
strongest across board in foreign inflation. For the measure of goodness-of-fit, Rw-
squared (which is more appropriate for RLS regression) is high at 84% and 81% 
explanations of variations in the model in the cases of The Gambia and Nigeria 
respectively, but very poor at 6% for Sierra Leone. The p-values of 0.00 of the Rn-
squared statistics reported for all the WAMZ countries indicate the strong rejection of 
the null hypothesis (the RLS version of Wald test) that all the non-constant estimated 
parameters are equal to zero, implying that all the variables employed could be 
included in the model. However, the p-values of the Jarque-Bera (J-B) statistics at 0.00 
across all estimations points to the rejection, at 1% level of significance, of the null 
hypothesis of normal distribution of the residuals. Generally across the WAMZ, the 
results of the evaluation of the EMP (without the monetary response factor) reveal a 
quite good number of similarities in the parametric responses from the estimated 
augmented G-R model of EMP. It is significant that the results for the lead economy in 
the WAMZ are all according to theoretical postulations and with high goodness-of-fit. When the sensitivity factor of monetary authority’s response was introduced into the 
EMP model, the results in Table 9 below show significant coefficients (at 1% level of 
significance) of the variable of sensitivity factor for the WAMZ countries (except for 
Guinea); and positive for all the countries (except for Liberia).  
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Table 9: Results of the Robust Least Square Regression Estimation of Exchange Market Pressure 
Model (With Monetary Response) 
Independent Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Constant ∆Domestic Credit/Money Base  
Domestic Real GDP Growth 
Foreign (US) Inflation ∆Money Multiplier ∆Commodity Price Index 
Monetary Response 
 
 
 
R2 
Rw2 
Deviance 
Prob. (Rn-Square Statistics) 
JB-Statistics (Prob.) 
No. of Observations 
-0.1036* 
-0.2014* 
0.7311* 
34.714* 
0.0010 
-0.0149* 
0.0055* 
 
 
 
-0.00 
0.85 
56.59 
0.00 
0.00 
159 
-0.7547* 
-2.2472* 
-0.0517 
10.2191* 
0.0362* 
-0.0203* 
0.0185* 
 
 
 
0.45 
0.75 
232.91 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
-1.4507* 
-69.4250* 
3.4200* 
-5.0092* 
-0.0472* 
-0.1334* 
0.009 
 
 
 
0.03 
0.33 
2131.38 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
2.8422* 
-
0.03636* 
-1.1595* 
13.2776* 
0.03775* 
-0.0042 
-0.1601* 
 
 
 
0.09 
0.18 
3336.60 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
-2.4097* 
-0.1720* 
2.6536* 
-5.3313* 
0.0094* 
-0.0240* 
0.2819* 
 
 
 
0.44 
0.82 
300.05 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
-0.1369* 
0.1825* 
0.1010* 
3.0906* 
0.0014 
-0.0197* 
0.00*** 
 
 
 
0.03 
0.06 
559.69 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
    Source: Author's Estimation and EViews9.5 Output 
What the significance of the variable of monetary response denote is that monetary 
authorities in The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone (given the positive and 
significant coefficients) absorb more pressure through the depreciation of domestic 
currency, relative reserve depletion, while in Liberia, more market pressure were 
absorbed by reserve depletion, relative to currency depreciation. Monetary authority in 
Guinea was sensitive to none of the EMP components. One general implication here is 
that if Nigeria, with the strongest positive significant coefficient of the monetary 
authority sensitivity factor at 0.2819 going to control over 90% of the economy of the 
WAMZ, it is therefore of high expectation that exchange market pressure will be 
absorbed more by depreciating the common currency. This is more appropriate in an 
exchange market integration. 
5. Conclusions 
The investigations of exchange markets pressures conducted in this research study to 
determine the vulnerability of the WAMZ countries to possible currency crisis (given 
past trends) produced the evidence to suggest that the six WAMZ countries may not 
likely to be vulnerable to currency crisis which may mar the eventual exchange market 
integration. The RLS estimations of the G-R model of exchange market pressure 
revealed uniform parametric responses to exchange pressures across the WAMZ. It is 
also significant that foreign (US) inflation has no influence on exchange market pressure 
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in the WAMZ’s leading economy. However, evidences gathered revealed mixed forms of 
the absorption of market pressure in the WAMZ, with the majority of the member 
countries of the WAMZ (including the lead economy) absorbing exchange market 
pressure through domestic currency depreciation relative to reserves depletion. These 
prompts the conclusion that in the eventual monetary union, foreign exchange market 
pressures are likely to be absorbed more by depreciation of the common currency 
rather than the depletion of reserves.  
Further assessments with higher frequency quarterly data revealed the failure of the 
models of exchange rate to hold while the cointegration of exchange rates and the 
fundamentals could not be established. Although, there were some few similarities in 
signs and magnitude of the explanations offered by exchange rate determination 
fundamentals, these similarities were not strong enough. Consequently, from the results 
of the assessments with both annual and quarterly data it cannot be confidently 
inferred that a common exchange rate and a single foreign exchange market is feasible 
for the WAMZ countries in the proposed single currency area. The adoption of a single 
exchange rate in a common foreign exchange market should therefore be considered 
with caution. The foreign exchange market is likely to be free from future currency 
crisis. Because of the possible and expected massive influence of Nigeria in the foreign 
exchange market, foreign inflation may not hugely impact the proposed exchange rate 
and the external value of the proposed single currency.  
References 
 
Bensaid, B., and Jeanne O. (1997). “The Instability of Fixed Exchange Rate Systems When Raising the Nominal Interest Rate Is Costly.” European Economic Review 
41(8):1461–178. 
 Bussiere, M and Mulder, C.  (1999). ‘External Vulnerability in Emerging Market 
Economies: How High Liquidity Can Offset Weak Fundamentals and the Effects of Contagion.’ IMF Working Paper No, 98/99. July. 
 
Dekle, R. Hsiao, C. and Wang, S. [1999] "Interest Rate Stabilization of Exchange Rates 
and Contagion in the Asian Crisis Countries," paper presented at the 1999 Pacific Basin 
Conference, San Francisco (September). 
 Eichengreen, B., Rose, A., and C. Wyplosz (1996). ‘Contagious Currency Crises’ NBER 
Working Paper No. 5681, July 1996. 
 
28 
 
Flood, R. P., and Jeanne, O. (2000). “An Interest Rate Defense of a Fixed Exchange Rate?” 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/00/159. Washington, D.C. 
 
Frenkel, J. A. (1976). ‘A Monetary Approach to the Exchange Rate: Doctrinal Aspects and 
Empirical Evidence’. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1976, 78(2):200-24. 
 Frenkel, J. and Rose, A. (1996),’ A Panel Project on Purchase Power Parity: Mean Reversion within and Between Countries’, Journal of International Economics, 40 pp. 
209-224. 
 Furman, J., and Stiglitz, J. E. (1998). “Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from East Asia.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
 Girton, L. and D. Roper (1977) ‘A Monetary Model of Exchange Market Pressure Applied to the Postwar Canadian Experience’. American Economic Review, 67, pp. 537-548. 
 Goldfajn, I., and P. Gupta. (1999). “Does Monetary Policy Stabilize the Exchange Rate Following a Currency Crisis?” International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/99/42. 
Washington, D.C. 
 Gould, D. M., and Kamin, S. B. (2000). “The Impact of Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates During Financial Crises.” International Finance Discussion Paper 669. Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C. 
 Gujarati, D. (2015). ‘Econometrics by Example’. London: Palgrave Macmillan Publisher. 
 Gujarati, D. N. and Porter, D.C. (2010). ‘Essentials of Econometrics’. New York: McGraw 
Hill. 
 Hill, R.C., Griffiths, W.E. and G. C. Lim (2008). ‘Principles of Econometrics’. New Jersey: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Kaminsky, G. L., and Reinhart, C. M. (1999). "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking 
and Balance-of-Payments Problems." American Economic Review, 89 (3): 473-500. 
 
Lahiri, A. and Vegh, C. A. (2003). "Delaying The Inevitable: Interest Rate Defense And 
Balance Of Payments Crises," Journal of Political Economy, 3(2):404-424. 
 
Mussa, M. (1976). ‘The Exchange Rate, the Balance of Payments and Monetary and Fiscal 
Policy under a Regime of Controlled Floating.’ Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 
78(2):229-48. 
 Sachs, J., Aaron Tornell, A. and Velasco, A. (1996). ‘Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: The Lessons from 1995.’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1996, No. 1 (vol. 27): 
147-199. 
 Tanner, E. (2001). ‘Exchange Market Pressure and Monetary Policy: Asia and Latin America in the 1990s’ IMF Staff Paper, 47 (3). 
 
